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This paper assesses agricultural household-firm unit models to determine a useful typology for 
agricultural policy assessment that draws upon their use. Both standard and bargaining models 
for analyzing household decisions, including production, consumption, labor, credit, fertility and 
child schooling, intergenerational transfer, among other key behaviors of households are 
discussed, as well as data and estimation issues often encountered with household models. 
Relevant dimensions of a country or region typology are then suggested, focusing on (1) the 
extent to which markets, particularly labor markets, are perfect, missing or mixed; (2) relevant 
intra-household and key demographic considerations; and (3) the differentiation of particular 
household-firm units that are particularly disadvantaged and may be of the most critical policy 
concern.  
 
KEY WORDS: agricultural households, farm households, labor, labor adjustments, off-farm 
employment      
 
1  Introduction 
 
Agricultural households in developing and developed countries are faced with a complex set of 
issues that influence, to a very significant extent, their livelihoods and livelihood strategies (Ellis 
1993; Caillavet, Guyomard and Lifran 1994; Carney 1998).  Policies focused on the agricultural 
sector produce effects that influence household behaviors well beyond farm production decisions.  
Further, given the inseparable nature of most farm household decisions related to farm 
production, household consumption, and labor supply and demand, among others, policy reform 
may result in feedback adjustments Lofren and Robinson 1999, Taylor and Adelman 2003).  
Other household behaviors and outcomes of concern – nutritional and health status, fertility, 
educational attainment, and other broader measures of household and individual well-being – are 
also likely to be influenced by policy reform in agriculture. The latter is particularly true in 
developing countries where the majority of households remain heavily dependent on own 
agricultural production for food supply and income.  But even in developed countries and the 
transition economies, the structure of agriculture depends on those policy incentives in place, and 
other household behaviors are affected by as well as affecting farm production decisions.  
Further, in both the developing country and developed country cases, the effects on the 
environment may further complicate the future spatial distribution of agriculture and the well-
being of households both as producers and consumers. 
 
This paper focuses on agricultural or farm households and the importance of households in the 
policy debate.  The farm household model is shown to be flexible in terms of consideration of 
relevant effects.  Key trends in agricultural households in both developed and developing 
countries are identified, focusing on changes in household composition and differences in access 
to key factors of production.  Potential indicators for analyzing farm adjustments and adjustments 
to policy change in a country typology in which households are explicitly considered are then 
suggested.  The focus is on both understanding differences across households in different country 
and region contexts and on understanding intra-household differences when they exist.  
 
  12  Household Models: Understanding Household Behaviors 
 
Chayanov (1925) and Nakajima (1957) are among the first who believed that behaviors of farm 
households were best understood in a household-firm framework, where potentially important 
interactions existed between external labor markets (nonfarm labor markets), the farm operation, 
and household consumption.  Becker’s (1981) unitary household model forms the foundation for 
the agricultural household model (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986), through its assumptions on 
household decision-making through a single household head.  However, the agricultural 
household model recognizes that agricultural producers both produce and consume the 
agricultural output produced by the household – i.e., the model assumes that farm output is 
consumed by producing households, with the surplus being marketed, a reality for most farm 
households in developing countries (Singh, et al. 1986). Further, the model incorporates a farm 
production function, reflecting the returns to farm self-employment. The agricultural household 
model assumes a nonlinear farm production function, assuming that the marginal returns to labor 
decline with increases in production.  The simple economic household model typically assumes 
that households maximize household utility subject to a set of constraints linear in the wage rate – 
inclusion of a function reflecting farm self-employment returns means that the returns to labor are  
assumed not constant.   Following Singh, et al. (1986), the unitary farm household model can be 
written: 
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where the household’s joint utility U is a function of the household’s joint consumption of market 
goods, consumption of home-produced goods, and household leisure. Utility is maximized 
subject to the production function, the household income constraint and the household total time 
constraint. 
 
When used in a developed country context where home consumption of own-produced goods 
typically constitutes a very small portion of total output, the model is typically written following 
Huffman (1991): 
 
h V h M h W X x W Q q P h C c P
X Q h F Q A X h F Q Q
h Z h L h C h U U MAX
+ + − =
> ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ =
=
0 / , 0 / ), , , ; , (
s.t.




A number of modifications in the 1980s agricultural household literature built upon the basic 
model.  For example, Iqbal (1986) extended the model to include borrowing behaviors, Roe and 
Graham-Tomasi (1986) introduced dynamics, and Saha incorporated seasonal variations.  In 
  2addition, basic revisions to the household model have been incorporated into the agricultural 
household model. These include explicit consideration of the quantity and quality of children , 
incorporation of a household production function (Gronau 1973, 1997), among others.  
 
Applications of the agricultural household model and extensions to this model have been 
widespread.  In most cases there has been explicit consideration of the composition of the 
household –  i.e., men, women and children.  This allows consideration of differences in labor 
allocation across the household, although the ‘black box’ assumption holds.  Applications of the 
basic model to developing countries are now common, with early and particularly noteworthy 
applications including   Lau, Lin and Yotopoulos (1978), Kuroda and Yotopoulos (1978), 
Adulavidhaya et al. (1979), Barnum and Squire (1978), Strauss (1984), Benjamin (1992), Jacoby 
(1993), Skoufias (1994), as examples of a large developing country literature.  In the developed 
and transitional economies, examples include Sumner (1982), Lopez (1986), Huffman and Lange 
(1989), Tokel and Huffman (1991), Kimhi (1994), Corsi and Findeis (2000), Weiss (1996 ), 
Schmitt (2001), among many others. Models have used cross-sectional as well as, more recently, 
panel data to analyze household behaviors, including consumption, (household) labor supply, and 
(hired) labor demand.  
 
The theoretical models have progressively evolved to reflect the relevant behaviors of farm 
households. While many applied studies continue to use the unitary model, in the 1990s the focus 
turned to the utility function itself.  Models in the 1990s seek to open the ‘black box’ of the 
household to better understand household outcomes: consumption, nutrition, labor supply and 
fertility, gender-targeted credit, intergenerational transfer, as examples (see Chiappori 1988, 
1992; Carlin 1991; Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene 1993; Apps and Rees 1996, 
1997; Behrman 1997; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Schultz 2001).  Different behavioral models that 
expand beyond the unitary model can be posited including both the collective and the bargaining 
(cooperative and noncooperative) models (see Doss, 1996 for a review).  
 
The collective models (‘pluralistic decision-making models’) focus on individuals within the 
household and relax the assumption of unified or aggregated preferences.  These models assume 
Parteo efficiency in intrahousholed allocations, but they do not assume cooperative or 
noncooperative behavior by individuals (Chiappori 1988, 1992, 1997). Chiappori (1992) agues 
that the rule governing a household distribution can be inferred by observing its external 
behavior, e.g., labor supply and aggregate consumption. The ‘rules’ governing resource allocation 
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  3Finally, a Nash-bargaining model  proposed by Manser and Brown (1980), and McElroy and 
Horney (1981), and later applied by McElroy (1990) can also be used.  McElroy and Horney 
(1981) and Manser and Brown (1980) independently developed the Nash-bargaining models of 
the household.  In the Nash-bargaining model, household members maximize the product of their 
gains from marriage in excess of their utilities outside of the union.  The household utility 
function is explicitly conflicting and dependent on the fallback positions of the individuals (Katz 
1992). These positions are referred to as ‘threat points’.  In the McElroy and Horney Nash-
bargaining model, there are two members of the household, m and f.  They receive utility from a 
pure public good, individual goods and leisure, subject to a set of constraints  For the agricultural 
household, the Nash-bargained model can be written as follows (drawing on Ott 1992, Mendoza 
1997, and Swaminathan 2003):   
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Applications of these models to agricultural households or in countries where agricultural 
households predominate include Jones (1986); Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan (1990), Quisumbing 
(1994), Doss (1996, 2001), Quisumbing and de la Bierre (2000), Findeis and Swaminathan (2002, 
2003), Swaminathan (2003), Nankhuni and Findeis (fc). Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 
(1997) provide a discussion of the policy issues related to intra-household resource allocation. 
 
As shown above, the models are quite flexible with regard to the behavioral assumptions reflected 
in the utility function and the constraint set.  Households of different types and over different time 
horizons can be modeled in this framework, to derive measures (elasticities) appropriate for 
determining impacts as well as adjustments over time. Variations in farm household impacts and 
responses to policy change will likely vary depending on their access to the different factors of 
production.  
 
2.1  Separability or Nonseparability: A Central Issue 
 
At the core of household models is the issue of separability, i.e., whether the household’s 
production, consumption and labor decisions are simultaneously or jointly determined 
(nonseparable) or if they are  recursive or separable.  If perfect markets exist for all outputs and 
factors of production, then prices are exogenous to the household.  In this case, transactions costs 
are zero, and the opportunity cost of any output or factor is its market price. As pointed out by 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), under these conditions it is immaterial if the household consumes 
all of its outputs or sells them, uses its own labor or sells its own labor, replacing it in farm 
production with hired-in labor. Perfect markets are a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
separability.  
 
  4Separability implies that production decisions of the household are not affected by consumption 
and labor supply decisions. However, labor supply and consumption decisions are not 
independent of production decisions. Production decisions are assumed to be made in the first 
stage optimization problem, allowing solution of factor demands, output supplies and optimal 
profit.  Given the optimal level of profit determined in the first stage, the second stage 
consumption  problem is solved.  Leisure demands for all household members and the demands 
for other commodities are determined, given the first stage results.   
 
However, in many contexts, market failure exists, resulting in nontradable outputs or factors of 
production (Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin (1996). Realistically, in many contexts households 
face mixed markets, where tradables as well as nontradables exist (Taylor and Adelman 2003).  
When markets are missing (or there are other context-specific characteristics such as the presence 
of risk), the household-firm model is rendered nonseparable.  In this case, decisions at the two 
levels of the household – production and consumption – must be jointly determined and 
simultaneously estimated.  Failure to consider this simultaneity will result in estimates of effects 
that are statistically inconsistent (Singh et al. 1986).  The further the household’s context is from 
‘perfect’, the more likely that measured effects will be inconsistent with actual responses. 
 
In most countries and regions, it is difficult to argue for separability. In developing and transition 
economies, the lack of markets, the existence of mixed markets, and the presence of risk are well-
accepted problems.  However, even in the developed countries the assumption of separability 
should be questioned and tested, since (as examples) the substitutability of labor between farm 
family labor and hired labor may be far from perfect, and risk exists. These issues are even more 
likely to arise when intra-household effects are considered – i.e., when the household’ black box’ 
is opened. 
 
2.2  Estimation Issues Related to Agricultural Household Models  
 
The broad application of household-firm models in the literature for both developing and 
developed countries provides a better understanding of how households behave under different 
constraints and in different contexts. However, it should be recognized that there are data and 
estimation issues that need to be confronted.   
 
The models that have been estimated to date have taken either a reduced-form approach (see 
discussion in Huffman 1991) or a systems approach. Even with the systems approach there are 
differences in the level of aggregation for the different components of interest in the estimation: 
consumption behaviors, labor supply and demand decisions, farm production decisions, among 
others. The systems approach is the most preferable of the two approaches.  However, the 
systems approach poses significant demands for data reflecting production, consumption and 
labor decisions.  Extensions of the model similarly pose the need for data on (for example) 
sources of formal and informal credit, fertility and schooling behaviors, nutritional status, among 
other behaviors or decisions of particular interest. At the same time, household-firm models have 
the ability to provide answers to important questions. 
 
Early models often used cross-sectional data (typically single year) on a region or country.  More 
recent models have used multiple production periods, to reflect the seasonality of production that 
is often critical when understanding household behaviors.  Other recent studies have used panel 
data that allow assessment of adjustments in household behaviors over time, allowing analysis of 
life-cycle effects, for example.  A significant advantage of data going beyond a single time period 
is the variation in prices that is observed.  An unfortunate attribute of cross-sectional data applied 
to a region, for example, is the often-lacking variation in input and output prices. 
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A second problem encountered frequently in the estimation of farm household-firm models is the 
existence of corner solutions.  At aggregate levels (e.g., in Lopez 1986), this is not a problem 
since high level of aggregation of commodities and inputs resolve the issue. However, in reality, 
the diversity of production choices means that not all outputs are produced consistently across all 
households and not all households use the same set of inputs. The same is the case for 
consumption and labor decisions where households may differ markedly in their consumption of 
different products or in their choices of different forms of work. The econometric issues implied 
by these realities of farm household-firms are well known (see Goetz, Weaver). 
 
And finally, the issue of model separability is critical.   
 
3  Typology Development 
 
The agricultural household model suggests that there are a number of parameters that could serve 
to define a useful typology for classifying farm household adjustments.   Three dimensions of a 
country typology from a household-farm model that deserve attention include:  
 
1.  The existence of perfect, mixed or missing input (labor, capital and land) and output markets 
using a unitary household approach;  
 
2.  The existence of intrahousehold differences in resource allocations, including labor/leisure and 
consumption; and 
 
3.  Impacts on disadvantaged populations or populations of particular societal concern, e.g., poor 
agricultural households in low-income countries. 
 
3.1 Labor markets 
    
The nonseparability of production and consumption decisions in an agricultural household model 
is most often argued on the basis of the lack of perfect labor markets. The ability of households to 
adjust to policy change in part reflects their ability to make adjustments within the household-
firm unit. Lack of consideration of these effects may reduce the ability of models to result in 
meaningful measurements of impacts of different policy scenarios (Lofgren and Robinson 1999).   
 
The existence of perfect labor markets implies that households are able to buy and sell labor in 
response to policy change. Two markets are critical: the market for hired farm labor and the 
market for off-farm labor.  Considering first markets for hired farm labor, under a price support 
regime, an increase in support prices is expected to result in increases in the allocation of labor 
resources to farming.  However, as farm household-firm income increases, the expectation is a 
greater time allocation to leisure by the household and the use of more hired labor, given that 
labor can be hired to substitute for farm operator labor. If substitutable labor cannot be hired, the 
allocation of time to leisure may not occur. Alternatively, under a decoupled direct payment 
scenario, the impact should be on household leisure, bypassing farm production decisions.  A 
comparison of the results from the two scenarios provides an assessment of the impacts of 
increased price supports (or decreased price supports) vs. increased direct payments (or decreased 
direct payments).  As shown in the first case, the scenario comparison breaks down when hired 
labor markets are missing or incomplete (see discussions in Sadoulet et al. 1998 and Taylor and 
Adelman 2003).       
 
  6Alternatively, if perfect markets exist for farm household labor family employed off the farm, 
then an increase in wages due to a greater demand for employment in off-farm labor markets 
should result in labor being reallocated to off-farm work from farm work. When off-farm labor 
markets are incomplete, underemployment of labor resources on the farm occurs (Olfert 1992).  
Both the existence of markets to allow the absorption of additional labor in the farm sector and to 
release labor from this sector should exist.   
 
But the reality is that in many rural areas of developing countries, and in fact in most places 
where households depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, perfect markets are not observed 
(Sadoulet et al. 1998)  Even in transition economies and developed economies, the existence of 
separability should be questioned (see Anton 1999). As a result, the adjustments differ from those 
that would be expected under a ‘perfect’ scenario. However, the responsiveness of individual 
countries or regions can be tested to determine their responsiveness to policy change under 
different scenarios. 
 
3.2 Labor themes 
 
In many developed countries there has been a significant increase in the prevalence of off-farm 
employment (Hallberg, Findeis and Lass 1991; Bryden, et al. 1992; Caillavet, Guyomard and 
Lifran 1994; OECD 2001).  Labor resources have been absorbed by external labor markets from 
farm households, reducing the underemployment problem for farm household labor that 
historically existed (see discussion Olfert 1992).  Off-farm employment among both farm men 
and women in developed countries is common, and has increased in the last half decade. 
Participation rates among farm women, in particular, have increased markedly, as women in the 
general population have moved into the formal labor force.  The overall result has been an 
increasing dependence of farm households on off-farm income (Mishra et al. 2003).  In the U.S. 
specifically, off-farm participation rates have increased from 37 percent among women and 48 
percent among men in 1980 (Rosenfeld 1985), to 53 percent and 52 percent among men and 
women, respectively, in 2001. Among the working-age farm population, the percentages are even 
higher – 62 percent for U.S. farm women and 59 percent for farm men (Findeis and Swaminathan 
2003). These statistics reflect an active U.S. off-farm labor market that provides both full-time 
and part-time work within commuting distance. Few farm households in the U.S. are 
characterized by long-distance labor migration (although farm family partnerships, in a sense, 
allow for the possibility of extension of the farm household into multiple distant labor markets).  
 
What is particularly interesting about the trend toward off-farm employment is its pervasiveness – 
the trend has been observed in the majority of developed countries.  Gardner notes the importance 
of technical change in releasing labor from farm production; technical change has similarly 
released labor from household production. Increasing off-farm wage rates in off-farm labor 
markets, smaller average family sizes, and levels of education among farm families becoming 
comparable to the education level of households more generally in some countries have also 
contributed to the trend, particularly for women. Farm women report that they are attracted to off-
farm labor markets for financial reasons: to cover household expenses, to finance the farm 
operation, to develop and maintain job skills, and to have a source of income under their own 
control.  Those U.S. farm households where there is no multiple job-holding or dual job-holding 
appear to be those in the more remote regions where off-farm jobs are less accessible. There are 
also a significant number of farms in the U.S. that do not participate in off-farm labor markets 
due to (advanced) age of farm owners.    
 
Markets also exist for hired farm labor, although there are likely to be locations even in 
developed countries where hired labor markets are not well developed.  The U.S. is particularly 
  7dependent on hired farm labor, in some cases substituting hired farm labor for farm family labor 
in urban off-farm labor markets (Findeis and Lass 1992).  This behavior was observed in urban-
adjacent labor markets where farms have ready access to urban consumers (and simultaneously to 
higher-wage off-farm employment). However, in most cases, at least in France (Benjamin and 
Kimhi 2003) and the U.S., hired farm labor and farm household labor are observed to be 
substitutes.   
 
In contrast, in developing countries, there is significant variation in the prevalence of off-farm 
employment. Shand and Otsuka and David provide evidence of off-farm activity in a number of 
Asian countries.  Hsu (1997) analyzed off-farm employment decisions under alternative rice 
production regimes in an nonseparable model for West Bengal India, and Mukherjee (1999) 
found significant effects in the same region over the period of liberalization in India, comparing 
1991 to 1997 household data. In Africa, Abdulai and Delgado (1999) and Swaminathan (2003) 
have analyzed nonfarm employment, in the latter case as related to gender-directed credit receipt 
for micro-enterprise development. For Mexico, Ortega-Sanchez (2001) reports important gender-
differences in the labor regimes of men vs. women, with men migrating long distances to off-
farm employment and women employed in local labor markets while maintaining (lower levels) 
of farm production.   
 
Studies undertaken  in developing countries on off-farm employment generally have shown that 
the off-farm job opportunities that farm households face are, in general, low-wage opportunities, 
except in some cases where self-employment in a nonfarm business enterprise is observed to pay 
higher returns to labor.  For example, In Malawi, the opportunities for working off the farm for 
women are limited except for ganyu labor which is low status and low income (Swaminathan and 
Findeis 2003).  In Gambia, off-farm employment opportunities, especially for women, are limited 
and generally low-wage (Mugalla 2000). In many cases, off-farm employment means hired farm 
employment (Mukhopadhyay 1994).   
 
The discussion above suggests that there are substantive differences between labor markets in 
which farm households buy and sell labor in developed and developing countries that deserve 
consideration in typology development. The presence or absence of markets, as well as the wage 
structure, will influence the extent to which farm households can combine off-farm employment 
with farm work as a livelihood strategy. Policy reform that resulted in greater off-farm 
employment in the New Zealand case, for example, may also be more likely in other similar 
contexts.  However, the ability to adjust is likely to vary significantly in country comparisons.    
 
Finally, it should be recognized that labor resources within farm households as well as labor 
markets differ substantially across countries. The extent to which labor markets exist and function 
influence farm household-firm adjustments but adjustments are also a function of the labor 
resources available to the household. The prevalence of AIDS/HIV in many countries and 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa severely threatens adjustment through labor markets that might 
otherwise be possible. Illness or death of household members severely erodes the productive 
labor resources of agricultural households (Mutangadura, Mukurazita, and Jackson 1999; 
Rugelema 2001; Topouzis 2000, 2001; Stokes 2003).  As shown by Stokes (2003), the negative 
impacts on human, social, financial, physical and natural capital are pervasive.  Health status of 
households will moderate the effects of any policy interventions dependent on shifts of labor 





  83.3  Interactions between labor and land markets 
 
The existence of land markets and the household’s access to land and other natural resources that 
support alternative livelihood strategies should be  additional dimensions of any typology to 
differentiate countries in terms of adjustment to policy reform.  Forms of land access (private 
ownership, rental, allocation from an alkalo, and other forms of land allocation) markedly differ 
across countries and even regions. Sizes, productivities, and environmental capacity of 
landholdings also vary markedly.  
 
Due to the capitalization of farm program benefits into land, farm household wealth in many 
developed countries is dependent on land ownership and productivity as well as on the magnitude 
of program payments (transfers). Reducing payments or even the expectation of reduced 
payments may reduce land values, reducing farm household-firm wealth. The balance between 
the cash income from farm profit and other earnings versus the wealth holdings through land is 
likely a critical dimension of being a farm household for many farm families in developed 
countries.  Even in developing countries with land ownership, wealth holding very typically takes 
the form of land. When land is not owned but is allocated for use by the household (as is the case 
in Gambia, for example), other assets such as cattle, horses, sheep and goats constitute the store 
of wealth. Changes in agricultural policies have the potential for affecting the land and asset 
(wealth) holdings in most situations.   
 
Adjustments to policy reform are likely to vary depending on the extent to which land markets 
exist. However, interactions at the farm household level between land and labor markets may 
moderate any impacts that might be expected. For example, for households able to work off the 
farm, farm exits may be less likely in response to changes in land prices.   
 
3.4   Labor and capital markets: access to credit  
 
A similar situation to that described above for labor can be constructed for capital markets.  That 
is, if a change in policy implies the need for additional capital in agriculture, credit markets can 
serve to facilitate this adjustment.  Constraints on access to credit are well-known in developing 
countries (Swaminathan 2003).  Even in the developed countries, capital borrowing to support 
farm production can be the norm.  
 
Access to capital to engage in agricultural production or to finance the development of other 
nonfarm self-employment activities may be affected by policy reform through declining land 
values that reduce the ability of farmer’s to secure borrowed capital. In developing countries, 
access formal credit is often rationed and access to informal credit is commonly linked to kinship 
ties, again a function of the household (Swaminathan 2003).   
 
At the same time, capital-labor linkages exist. The out-migration that occurs to access labor 
earnings may in part be a response to tight credit in local credit markets (Massey et al. 1989).  
 
4  Intrahousehold effects 
 
 
The advantage of adding intrahousehold effects to models is that there are likely to be important 
differences across individuals comprising agricultural households that play out in terms of the 
effects of policy.  Behaviors may vary by the gender composition of the household or by age 
composition, as examples. Behaviors, and the ability to bear risk, may also depend on household 
size.     
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4.1 Gender  
 
In some countries women are not allowed to work in off-farm labor markets, and the ability of 
household labor to respond to policy signals is restricted.  In many countries, men’s and women’s 
work on the farm is strictly defined by crop or task (Doss 1996).  Income earned by men and 
women may be pooled or not, depending on household structure (Mugalla 2000). Gender also has 
been shown to be increasingly important in understanding resource allocation decisions within 
households (Pitt et al. 1990 )  
 
The allocation of labor across types of work (own farm work, nonfarm self- employment, wage 
work and home economic production) as well as the allocation of work within the household by 
gender are important considerations, since the household’s well-being and the well-being of its 
individuals depend on the income generated through work, the receipt of employer-provided 
benefits, as examples.  Further, because labor resources are mobile, the allocation of household 
labor resources across space also can result in important effects, raising questions of remittances, 
seasonal variations in time allocations that mean that some household members are not available 
for farming, and the possibility of a significant dispersion of farm household members to different 
work activities – to off-farm local employment, cross-border to other destinations with jobs, and 
on the farm itself.  Indicators of household well-being are very often a function of the 
household’s quantity and quality of labor resources and labor time allocation choices to the set of 




The age distribution of the household can also have important effects. One major function of 
agricultural households is to supply labor to meet farm needs. Over the life-cycle, the individual’s 
ability to supply productive labor to farm varies, and gradually declines in the later stages of the 
cycle. Population profiles by age show that in most developed countries the profile is flat and 
extended into older age groups than is the case in other countries throughout the world – most 
other countries have a bell-shaped population profile, heavily weighted toward the young and 
much narrower in the older age groups.  
 
The ‘aging of the population’ observed in many developed countries is a relevant trend that can 
be analyzed when a household perspective is taken. To maintain the farm, intergenerational 
transfer issues become important for maintaining a consistent farm labor supply and may cause 
major adjustments in the farm operation. Major changes in reliance on earned versus unearned 
income as well as major adjustments in livelihood strategies can occur as age progresses – the 
ability of farm households to secure the same level of income from off-farm employment or 
nonfarm businesses, changes in intergenerational relationships between parents and children 
within the extended household, and adjustments in household expenditure patterns. 
 
Potential Indicators:  Discussion 
 
Given the discussion above, potential indicators can be suggested for developing a useful 
typology.  Since it is likely that external labor markets may have key effects, potential indicators 
include measures of participation in off-farm employment and the level of off-farm 
wages/income.  The prevalence of nonfarm self-employment activity or micro-enterprise 
development are also potential indicators, since these activities.may be substitutes for farm work. 
Given a household perspective, these indicators by selected characteristics (e.g., gender) provide 
the most realistic understanding of the effects that may occur in response to policy reform.  
  10Further, indicators that reflect land size and asset holdings, forms of access to land, and access to 
credit (all measures affected by and/or affecting household labor availability and use), should be 
included.  These measures serve to reflect household access to natural resources needed for 
agricultural production.  Finally, demographic indicators should be included in any typology to 
analyze policy reform. Examples include the age structure of the population, household size and 
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